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FAMILY LAW-INTERESTED PERSON'S LACK
OF ADVOCACY APPROACH AWARENESS
PROMPTS MOTION TO INTERVENE DENIAL-IN
RE GUARDIANSHIP OF B. V. G., 27 N.E.3D 842
(MASS. APP. CT. 2015).
In guardianship cases of incapacitated persons, the court may
appoint a qualified person' to make decisions regarding the incapacitated
person's care, support, education, health, and welfare. 2 However, the court
also has the ability to "limit the powers of a guardian ... and thereby create
a limited guardianship." 3
In In re Guardianship of B. V G., the
Massachusetts Appeals Court considered whether the trial judge erred in
denying a motion to intervene based upon the petitioner's lack of standing
as an "interested person" under the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code
(hereinafter referred to as "MUPC"), chapter 190B, section 5-306(c) of
Massachusetts General Laws.4 The Court concluded that the petitioner, the
maternal grandfather of B.V.G., did qualify as an "interested person," but
held that the trial court's denial of his motion to intervene with the current
guardianship (B.V.G.'s father) was nevertheless valid and appropriate.5
The grounds upon which the Appeals Court based their affirmation was a
close reading of the trial court judge's decision, which expressed the belief
that B.V.G.'s interests were being "adequately
represented without [her]
' ,6
party.
a
as
participation
grandfather's
1 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-305 (2009) (including incapacitated person's spouse,
parent(s), previously nominated guardian, or person deemed appropriate by court). Guardianships
are "creatures of statute." See Care and Prot. of Jamison, 4 N.E.3d 889, 901 (Mass. 2014)
(distinguishing statutory rights as guardian with fundamental parental rights in relationships with
their children). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 1-302 (2012) (granting Probate and
Family Court jurisdiction over appointment and management of guardians).
2 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309 (2009) (establishing scope of guardian's

decisional capacity).
3 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-306(c) (2009) (establishing court's power to place
limitations on guardian). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-209(a) (2009) (noting
guardians, subject to conditions, are statutorily granted "the powers and responsibilities of a

parent").
4 See In re Guardianship of B.V.G., 27 N.E.3d 842, 843 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (considering
appropriateness of "interested person" standard and subsequent denial of motion).

5 See id at 847-49 (affirming motion to intervene denial, however citing grounds differing
from those of trial court).

6 Id. at 848 (examining court's decision to infer probable holdings regarding adequate
representation issues in event of remand). The court states remand would ordinarily occur to
allow the trial court to address the issue of adequate representation, but the court maintains the
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In In re Guardianship of B. V. G., the maternal grandfather of

B.V.G. sought to restore and strengthen his relationship with his adult
granddaughter (hereinafter referred to as "B.V.G."), whose father was
serving as her temporary guardian.7 B.V.G.'s grandfather (hereinafter

referred to as "Grandfather") claimed an intervention of right and
subsequently filed a motion to intervene 8 with Norfolk County's Probate
and Family Court guardianship proceedings regarding B.V.G. on the
grounds that he was an interested person in the matter. 9 The temporary
guardianship awarded to B.V.G.'s father provided for email contact
between B.V.G. and Grandfather, but Grandfather alleged B.V.G.'s father
prevented her reception of Grandfather's emails. 10 B.V.G.'s father did not
dispute his restriction of B.V,G.'s contact with Grandfather; rather, he
maintained he had the right to do so as her guardian and stated that
Grandfather did not qualify as an "interested person" as defined by the
Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code." The Probate and Family Court
trial judge found the best interest advocacy for B.V.G. could be attained without B.V.G.'s
grandfather as an interested party in the matter. Id. at 849.
7 See In re Guardianship of B.VG., 27 N.E.3d at 843 (establishing partie's respective
objectives in proceedings). B.V.G., although an adult, was assessed as needing a guardian due to
her diagnoses of various impairments, including: "intellectual disability, Tourette syndrome, and
emotional difficulties." Id. B.V.G.'s parents separated when she was young and her father was
awarded sole legal and physical custody. Id. He retained sole legal and physical custody until
B.V.G. reached the age of majority, at which time the temporary guardianship began. Id. During
this period, B.V.G.'s contact with her mother and maternal relatives was non-existent, including
with her grandfather. Id.
8 See id at 843, 847-48 (detailing grandfather's purpose for the motion). Grandfather filed
his motion to intervene based on a claimed intervention of right, which states:
[A]nyone [applying timely) shall be permitted to intervene in an action.., when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a particular
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
MASS. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); see In re Guardianshipof B. V.G., 27 N.E.3d at 847-48 (explaining
MASS. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2), relied on by grandfather).
9 See In re GuardianshipofB. V.G,, 27 N.E.3d at 843 (explaining grounds for pleadings); see
also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 19013, § 5-306(c) (2009) (establishing court's ability to limit, remove,
or modify guardianships).
"0 See In re Guardianship of B. VG., 27 N.E.3d at 844 (noting terms of guardianship's
allowed communications and interception of such communications). The guardianship terms
provided for B.V.G. and Grandfather to each send one daily email to one another, as the
relationship between B.V.G. and Grandfather was undisputedly non-detrimental. Id.
" See id. at 844-45 (outlining B.V.G.'s father's stance against Grandfather's allowance as
interested person). An "interested person" is defined as:
[I]nclud[ing] heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and any others
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judge denied Grandfather's motion based upon the conclusion that he
lacked standing as an "interested person" under chapter 190B, section 5306(c) of Massachusetts General Laws.12 Upon review, the Massachusetts
Appeals Court affirmed the denial on the grounds B.V.G.'s interests were
being represented adequately, 13 therefore Grandfather's intervention was
unnecessary, despite his qualification as an "interested person."' 14 Further,
the intervention of right claimed by Grandfather did not meet the sufficient
standard due to B.V.G.'s interests already being adequately represented. 15
6 the Supreme Judicial Court of
In Gardiner v. Jardine,1
Massachusetts (hereinafter referred to as "SJC") addressed former guardian
statute chapter 201, section 14 of Massachusetts General Laws (hereinafter
referred to as "Section 14")," which permitted petitions for appointments
of temporary guardians by, inter alia, "other person[s] of interest.""' John

having a property right in or claims against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent,
ward, or protected person. It also includes persons having priority for appointment as
personal representative, and other fiduciaries representing interested persons.
MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 190B, § 1-201(24) (2009).
12 See In re GuardianshipofB. V.G., 27 N.E.3d at 843 (denying Grandfather as "interested

person"). The court may limit the powers of a guardianship by its own motion or appropriate
petition made by the incapacitated person "or other interested person," therefore creating a
limited guardianship. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-306(c) (2009) (granting court
authority for limiting power of guardians).
3 See In re GuardianshipofB. VG., 27 N.E.3d at 848-49 (finding adequate representation is
supported by motion judge's assessment). The attorney appointed to represent B.V.G. did not
express a definitive stance on whether Grandfather's motion to intervene should be allowed, but
rather expressed his own understanding of B.V.G.'s support regarding increasing her contact with
Grandfather. See id. at 844 (explaining B.V.G's attorney's assertions during motion hearing).
14 See id. at 849 (explaining denial of motion to intervene because of adequate representation
of B.V.G.). The Probate and Family Court judge highlighted that counsel appointed to B.V.G.
"indicated he was largely in agreement that fostering a relationship with the grandfather would be
beneficial for B.V.G., and [Grandfather] has made no showing that B.V.G.'s attorney [would] fail
to press that issue going forward." Id.
15 See id. (eliminating intervention of right for guardianship modification when adequate
representation is present); see also Alexander v. Rendell, 246 F.R.D. 220, 229 (W. D. Pa. 2007)
(establishing necessary factors for valid intervention of right). Alexander states that all
components to establish an intervention of right are met when:
(1) the application for intervention of right is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient
interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical
matter by the disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not adequately
represented by an existing party in the litigation.
Id.
16 139 N.E. 481 (Mass. 1923).

17 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201, § 14 (repealed in 2009) (detailing guardian standards).
18 See Gardiner,"139 N.E. at 481 (allowing for broader, more general category of persons to
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D. Gardiner, uncle and heir presumptive of the incapacitated person,
Dorothy Davies Gordon, filed a petition with the court seeking removal of
Gordon's appointed guardian, William F. Jardine. 19 Jardine objected on the
grounds that Section 14 stated a "person in interest" permitted to intervene
must have a pecuniary interest, which Gardiner lacked. 20 The SJC held a
person of interest within the meaning of Section 14 did not require having a
pecuniary interest in the matter, 21 but rather any person would qualify as
such "if, acting in good faith, he believes that the welfare of [a
minor/incapacitated person] requires that a temporary restraint should be
immediately placed upon such person or his property." 22 The court
construed the meaning of Section 14 to be "broad enough to include those
who have a genuine humanitarian interest in the persons . . . unable
properly to care for themselves or their property," thus Gardiner had
standing 23to petition the court for removal of Jardine as Gordon's
guardian.
Post Gardiner, chapter 190B, section 1-201 of Massachusetts
General Laws has provided general definitions of terms used in a variety of
probate cases, including guardianships, and begins by stating the
definitions are "[s]ubject to additional definitions contained in the
subsequent articles that are applicable to specific articles, parts, or sections,
and unless the context otherwise requires, in this chapter." 24 Chapter 190B,
section 1-201(24) of Massachusetts General Laws declares, by definition,
that an interested person:
[I]ncludes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,

serve as temporary guardians).
19 See id. at 481 (outlining pleadings of both parties, also grounds for respondent's
objection).
20 See id.at 481-82 (outlining pleadings of both parties, also grounds for respondent's
objection); see also In re Guardianship of Santrucek, 896 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ohio 2008) (including
interest relating to property or transaction sufficient to be declared interested person).
21 See Gardiner, 139 N.E at 482. The SJC also held that Section 14 did not require that a
"person of interest" have private rights affected, nor that said person have a familial relation to
the incapacitated person. Id.
22 See id (authorizing interest in ward's welfare to establish standing, even absent pecuniary
interest).
23 See id (interpreting applicable statute to encompass petitioner within "interested person");
see also Morrison v. Jackman, 8 N.E.2d 18, 18-19 (Mass. 1937) (factoring urgency in interested
person's guardian appointment). The court in Morrison deemed that the appointment of a
guardian via petition of any person of interest is appropriate if the welfare of the incapacitated
person requires such immediate appointment. See Morrison, 8 N.E.2d at 19 (holding
appointment of temporary guardian appropriate when welfare of insane person is in jeopardy).
24 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 1-201 (2009) (emphasis added) (conveying flexibility in
application of terms defined in Section 1-201).
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beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or
claims against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent,
ward, or protected person. It also includes persons having a
priority for appointment as personal representative, and
other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The
meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from
time to time and shall be determined according to the
particular 25
purposes of, and matter involved in, any
proceeding.
Commonwealth v.Durha m6 interpreted the word "including" to
bespeak "an expansion rather than an exclusion., 27 It was In re
Guardianshipof Williams28 that utilized this expansion of the category of
interested persons by allowing the petitioner, with no apparent financial or
property interest in the guardianship of her brother, to "participate fully" 2in9
the proceedings, wherein her sisters were being appointed co-guardians.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire highlighted the conclusion that it
was legislative intent to allow petitions by "interested persons" to be wideranging in order to "promote the broadest possible protection for a
proposed ward by granting generous standing to any adult with an interest
in the proposed ward's welfare. 30
In regards to intervention of right being domineered by adequate
representation, the standard in Massachusetts dates back to 1974 when
Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure provided for intervention of right
"when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
25 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 1-201(24) (2009).
-26 843 N.E.2d 1035 (Mass. 2006).
27 See id. at 1041

(broadening category of persons by examining diction); Doe v.

Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1094-95 (Mass. 1995) (stating use of
word "including" did not dictate exhaustive list). The legislature's use of the phrase "including
but not limited to a gun or a knife," in describing dangerous weapons not permitted to be
possessed on school premises, left discretion to the principal as to whether a particular object

constituted a dangerous weapon. See Doe, 653 N.E.2d at 1095(defining "including: in statute).
25 986 A.2d 559 (N.H. 2009).
29 See In re Guardianship of Williams, 986 A.2d at560-61 (granting standing for
participation in proceedings without pecuniary interest).
30 See id. at 564 (explaining legislative intent behind guardianship statute); see also In re
Conservatorship of Kloss, 109 P.3d 205, 207 (Mont. 2005) ("meaning of interested person 'may
vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purposes of and matter
involved in any proceeding."'); In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Cordel, 741 N.W.2d
675, 680 (Neb. 2007) ("To limit the persons 'interested in the welfare' of the protected person...
would be superfluous and incongruent with the term 'any."').
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ability to protect thatkinterest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties." 31 When petitioning the court claiming an
intervention of right, "[t]he burden of showing the inadequacy of the
representation is on the applicant [seeking to intervene]." 32 Hoots v.
Pennsylvania33 highlights the minimal burden and explains that
representation can be deemed inadequate on any of the following three
grounds: (1) that although the applicant's interests are similar to those of a
party, they diverge sufficiently that the existing party cannot devote proper
attention to the applicant's interests; (2) that there is collusion between the
representative party and the opposing party;
or (3) that the representative
34
party is not diligently prosecuting the suit.
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo 35 established a general presumption of
adequate representation when the representative is either an officer charged
by law with representing interests
of another or is a governmental body
36
representing interests of another.
In In re Guardianship of B. V G.,37 the Massachusetts Appeals
Court focused on the language of chapter 190B, section 5-306(c) of
Massachusetts General Laws, which states, in relevant part: "The court, at
the time of appointment or later, on its own motion or on appropriate
petition or motion of the incapacitated person or other interested person,
may limit the powers of a guardian . . . and thereby create a limited
guardianship."3 The court then highlighted the MUPC's general definition
and scope of an "interested person," which delineates that the category:
[I]ncludes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or
31 MASS. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

32 See Mass. Fed'n of Teachers v. Sch. Comm. of Chelsea, 564 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (Mass.
1991) (quoting Att'y Gen. v. Brockton Agric. Soc'y, 456 N.E.2d 1130, 1132 (Mass. 1983))
(allocating burden of proof to moviqg party when alleging inadequate representation).
3 672 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 1982). This case focuses on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a),
which is identical to Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). See id. at 1134-35 (discussing
intervention right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (a)(2), (b)(2)).
34 Hoots, 672 F.2d at 1135. See Harris v. Pemsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating
incidentally affected claim 's insufficient). There must be a "tangible threat" to applicant's legal
interest and the threatened legal interest must be "legally cognizable" in order for right to
intervene. Id. at 601; see United States v. Perry Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir.
1978) (denying applicant's motion due to lack of substantial legally protected interest).
" 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976).
36 See id. at 505 (noting when presumption of adequate representation replaces burden of

proof standard).
17 27 N.E.3d 842 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015).
38 See id. at 845 (explaining order of appointment statute); see also MASS. GEN. LAws ch.

190B, § 5-306(c) (2009) (granting court's ability to limit, modify, or remove guardianships).
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claims against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent,
ward, or protected person. It also includes Persons having
priority for appointment as personal representative, and
other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The
meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from
time to time and shall be determined according to the
particular purposes
of, and matter involved in, any
39
proceeding.
Based upon these two statutes, the Court rejects the assertion made
by B.V.G.'s father that Grandfather lacks standing as an "interested
person" because the use of the word "include" in this context indicates the
list was not intended to be exhaustive. 40 The Court reinforced this
reasoning by emphasizing the MUPC notes that definitions may not apply
in varying probate proceedings if "the context otherwise requires" and,
additionally, that the meaning of "interested person" has the capacity to
vary "and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and
matter involved in, any proceeding." 41
The surrounding sections of the statute were viewed in unison by
the Court as well, as they stressed said sections must be "construed in
harmony with one another."42 Specifically, the Court referenced chapter
190B, section 5-303(a) of Massachusetts General Laws, which - instead of
using the term "interested person" - mentions that "any person interested in
the welfare of the person alleged to be incapacitated" may file a petition for
guardianship.43 In analyzing the consequences, were the Court to require
an interested person to have a pecuniary interest, the court found there
would be discordance with statutory intent, wherein Grandfather would
have standing to file his own petition for a limited guardianship pursuant to
Section 5-303(a), yet lack standing to petition the court to impose a limited
guardianship pursuant to chapter 190B, section 5-306(c) of Massachusetts
General Laws. 44 By this logic, the Court concluded that "interested
39 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 1-201(24) (2011) (defining interested person); see also
In re GuardianshipofB. V.G., 27 N.E.3d at 845 (noting MUPC definition of "interested person").
40 In re GuardianshipofB. V.G., 27 N.E.3d at 845-46 (adopting former reasoning to expand

scope of interested persons).
41 See id.at 846 (identifying situations where static definitions would be inappropriate); see
also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 1-201(24) (2011) (noting flexibility of provided terms and
definitions).
42 See In re Guardianshipof B. V.G., 27 N.E.3d at 846 (approaching meanings of applicable

statutes in conjunction with one another rather than separately).
41 See id. (identifying differing language between MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-303(a)
and § 5-306(c)).
44 See id. (highlighting logical discrepancies in establishing qualified standing between
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person" and "person interested in the welfare of the [incapacitated] person"
were intended to be equivalent under the MUPC, therefore Grandfather did
have standing to file his motion to intervene, and thus the trial court was
incorrect on this matter.45
In support of this reasoning regarding interested persons, the Court
logically paralleled In re Guardianshipof B. V G. with In re Guardianship
of Williams,46 wherein the New Hampshire Supreme Court deemed a
petitioner with no pecuniary interest to be an "interested person" because
legislative intent was to "promote the broadest possible protection for a
proposed ward by granting generous standing to any adult with an interest
' 7
in the proposed ward's welfare.A
However, the Court in In re
Guardianship of B. VG. affirmed the denial of Grandfather's motion to
intervene by relying on Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2),
which provides for intervention of right ".... unless the applicant's interest
is adequately represented by existing parties."'48 Here, the court examined
the trial judge's assessment which noted that B.V.G.'s counsel agreed that
a relationship for his client with Grandfather would be beneficial, and that
Grandfather made no showing that said counsel would fail to raise that
concern or interest when proceeding. 49 For this reason, the Court affirmed
the trial court's denial of Grandfather's motion to intervene.50
The Court's comprehensive scrutiny of the MUPC and
consideration of its statutory intent of uniformity renders a sound
conclusion and illuminates approaches to be successful when filing motions
to intervene.5 1 As in Gardinerv. Jardine,an individual should qualify as a

similarly intentioned statutes).
45 See id (noting trial court error by expressing statutory intent would grant standing to
Grandfather).
46 986 A.2d 559 (N.H. 2009).
47 In re Guardianshipof B. .G., 27 N.E.3d at 847 (conceding Grandfather lacked pecuniary
interest, but promoted B.V.G.'s wellbeing and protection); In re Guardianshipof Williams, 986
A.2d at 564 (promoting protection for ward compensated for lack of pecuniary interest in
establishing interested person). The court in In re Guardianship of B. V.G. emphasizes the
MUPC's requirement for judges to impose limitations on a capacitated person's liberty only to
the extent said person's needs "cannot be met by less restrictive means," which encourages
limitations on guardianships, therefore allowing a broader class of people to seek such limitations
and further the MUPC's goal to support liberty. 27 N.E.3d at 847.
48 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (outlining permissible circumstances for intervention of
right).
4' See In re Guardianship of B.V.G., 27 N.E.3d at 848-49 (examining B.V.G.'s
representation and said representation's anticipated advocacy on her behalf).
so See id. at 849 (deeming Grandfather's advocacy for B.V.G.'s wellbeing unnecessary when
representation for same purpose already present).
51 See id. at 846 (referencing inferred intent of legislature in diction of statutes). A person
without pecuniary interest-should have standing to file his own petition for a limited guardianship
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person of interest "if, acting in good faith, he believes that the welfare of [a
minor/incapacitated person] requires that a... restraint should be... placed
upon such person or his property," regardless of presence of a pecuniary
interest. 2 However, even with a valid interest, a motion to intervene must
be made to protect that interest. 3 The MUPC emphasizes the importance
of protecting the greatest extent of liberty for all persons,54 and as such, a
person filing a motion to intervene with the intent to limit a guardianship
should advocate personal interest in the principal's liberty and promote less
restrictive means, if possible, to meet said principal's needs, which is
interpreted as acting in the principal's best interest.5 5 As the Court in In re
Guardianshipof Williams56 held, allowing more people to file motions to
intervene and limit guardianships creates more advocacy for the broadest
possible protection for the principal.5 7 It appears that, when filing a motion

pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-303, as well as have standing to petition the court to

impose a limited guardianship pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-306(c) and, as such,
an "interested person" and a "person interested in the welfare of the [incapacitated) person" under
the respective statutes are equivalent, Id.
52 See Gardiner v. Jardine, 139 N.E. 481, 482 (Mass. 1923) (holding ward's welfare interest
more important than presence of pecuniary interest in guardianship proceedings).
53 See In re Guardianship of Santrucek, 896 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ohio 2008) (denying
protection of valid interest due to interested person's lack of motion to intervene). This court
notes that, although numerous family members, friends, or even neighbors could be impacted by
the outcome of guardianship proceeding, not all persons will have a "legally sufficient interest to
allow them to become parties to the proceedings..." Id. Being related to a ward is insufficient
to confer party status on a person, as is being served with notice of proceedings. Id. at 687.
Further, intervening parties only have standing "to the extent necessary to protect the interest that
justifies the intervention." Id. at 686-87.
54 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-306(a) (2009) ("The court shall exercise the
authority conferred in this part so as to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and
independence of the incapacitated person and make appointive and other orders only to the extent
necessitated by the incapacitated person's limitations or other conditions warranting the
procedure."); see also In re Sylvester, 598 A.2d 76, 83-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (noting ward's
nomination is to be made unless said nominee is deemed unsuitable).
51 See In re GuardianshipofB. V.G., 27 N.E.3d at 847 (opining best interest of ward includes
least restrictive means to achieve welfare). Allowing more people to advocate for an individual's
liberty coincides with the MUPC's goal of promoting individualism to the greatest possible
extent. See id. (articulating foals of MUPC); see also In re Guardianship of Smitt, 684 N.E.2d
613, 616 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (highlighting importance of ward's guardianship nomination).
The Smith court stated its obligation to make a guardianship appointment in accordance with the
ward's nomination, absent disqualification or good cause to do otherwise. See id. at 616.
(explaining Massachusetts Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, G. L. c. 201B guardianship
appointment mandate).
6 986 A.2d 559 (N.H. 2009).
57 See id. at 564 (acknowledging heightened likelihood of achieving best interest by

broadening class able to advocate for ward); see also Azarian v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 423
N.E.2d 749, 750 (Mass. 1981) (emphasizing interested persons are entitled to his or her "day in
court"); Porotto v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 75 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Mass. 1947) (declaring matter not
"finally determined and adjudicated" if interested person never received notice); Dowd v. Morin,
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to intervene, approaching the court by promoting the best interest of the
principal is more impactful in having the motion allowed, rather than
promoting a pecuniary interest, despite presence of a pecuniary interest
once being considered the standard.58
Another beneficial strategy when approaching the court as a
petitioner seeking to limit a guardianship may include emphasizing any
uniqueness of the subjective circumstances in conjunction with
highlighting the MUPC's definition section, which states definitions given
stand "unless the context otherwise requires." 59 This approach could
6
demonstrate an appropriateness in the court expanding interested persons, 0
as Commonwealth v. Durham exhibited such ideals by examining diction
and emphasizing that the use of the word "includes" bespeaks expansion
rather than an exhaustive definition.6 1 Encouraging a broad category of
persons with standingto file motion for guardianship intervention, as in In
re Guardianshipof Williams,62 allows for a petitioner to advocate his or her
sincere interest in the principal's wellbeing, which heightens the likelihood
said motion will be allowed by the court.63
Even with established standing a person interested in the welfare of
the principal, it is imperative for that person to demonstrate, in good faith,
that the principal has inadequate representation in order to successfully
intervene in guardianship proceedings.64 As Hoots v. Pennsylvania65

471 N.E.2d 120, 123-24 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (noting proceedings can be reopened if notice not
given to interested person).

58 See In re Guardianship of Williams, 986 A.2d at 560-61 (stating pecuniary interest
requirement for interested person qualification changes standard); see also In re Guardianship of
Santrucek, 896 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ohio 2008) ("[T]he disposition of the action may ...
impair or
impede [the petitioner's) ability to protect [an] interest, unless [said] interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.").
59 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 1-201 (2011) (identifying diverse circumstances
among variety of probate proceedings wherein static definitions would be inappropriate).
60 In jurisdictions where the definition of "interested persons" is still interpreted as requiring
a pecuniary interest, advocating for the best interest of the principal and petitioner's involvement
as being imperative to such interest would nevertheless demonstrate fairness in the judicial
system and primary concern for principal's wellbeing. See Bauer v. Shepard, 634 F. Supp. 2d
912, 917 (N.D. Ind. 2009).
61 See Commonwealth v. Durham, 843 N.E.2d 1035, 1041 (Mass. 2006) (examining word
selection and subsequent impact on procedural outcomes).
62 986 A.2d 559 (N.H. 2009).
63 See id. at 564 (broadening definition for persons with standing). See also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-207(b) (2009) (noting any interested party may petition to limit guardian's
power); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-212(a) (2009) (stating any interested person over
fourteen years old may petition to remove guardian).
64 See In re Guardianship of B.V.G., 27 N.E.3d 842, 848-49 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015)
(maintaining interested person advocating interests already represented shall not be allowed to
intervene); see also Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975)
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outlined, a petitioner could show inadequate representation by
demonstrating the presence of one of the following: diverging interests
wherein counsel cannot devote proper attention to the principal's interests,
collusion between counsel and opposing party, or counsel is not diligent in
the suit. 66 In In re Guardianshipof B. V.G., Grandfather should have stated
to the court that the neutrality of B.V.G.'s attorney in regards to
Grandfather's motion did not foster the best interests of B.V.G., and thus
diligence was lacking or interests were diverted due to counsel's lack of
promotion regarding the contact B.V.G. expressed she wanted with
Grandfather. 67
Although Pennsylvania v. Rizzo 68 demonstrated a
presumption of adequate representation can be present, emphasizing to the
court a flaw in counsel's advocacy can aid in refuting that general
presumption. 69 This discrepancy in adequate representation, regardless of
the position of the advocate, should be compelling because, as a nation, the
court system is intended to promote and values "judicial fairness,
impartiality, independence,
integrity, competence, the principles of justice,
70
law.",
of
rule
the
and
(referencing importance of case-specific circumstances in determining adequate representation).
Adequate representation in context of class claims rests on attorney being "qualified, experienced,
and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation" as well as no presence of antagonistic
interests between those of the plaintiff and those of the class. Id.; see also Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (deeming diverse interests can weaken ability of
attorney to adequately represent parties in class action). Although an interested person does not
require litigation experience to obtain standing for intervention in guardianship proceedings, an
advocate's interests logically cannot be antagonistic to those of the ward, otherwise promoting the
best interests of the ward is inherently unattainable. In re GuardianshipofB. V.G., 27 N.E.3d at
847.
65 672 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 1982).
66 Id at 1135 (enumerating methods to demonstrate inadequate representation present in
proceeding). See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating incidentally
affected claim is insufficient; rather "tangible threat" to applicant's legal interest required).
67 See In re Guardianshipof B. VG., 27 N.E.3d at 844 (acknowledging BV.G.'s attorney's
stance in regards to Grandfather's involvement in proceeding). B.V.G.'s attorney found her
relationship with Grandfather to be non-detrimental, admitted B.V.G. desired contact with
Grandfather, but nevertheless did not promote Grandfather's contact with her or his involvement
in proceeding. See id. (explaining B.V.G.'s attorney's assertions in court).
68 530 F.2d 501 (3d. Cir. 1976).
69 See id. at 505 (presuming adequate representation when advocate embodies specific roles).
By stressing weaknesses in said advocate's representation, the roles of advocate - as an officer
charged by law to represent another or a governmental body representing another (providing a
presumption of adequate representation) - may diminish in importance when compared to the
quality of ward's representation to the extent that representation is flawed.
70 See Bauer v. Shepard, 634 F. Supp. 2d 912, 917 (N.D.Ind. 2009) (stressing rules of
conduct should adhere to historical values important to administration of justice). The Bauer
court also expresses value placed on promoting public confidence in the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary, which would logically be compromised if the presumption of
adequate representation could not be refuted simply by a position or title belonging to the

194

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

The Court in In re Guardianshipof B. V.G. examined whether a
petitioner seeking to limit a guardianship, by way of filing a motion to
intervene, has standing without having a pecuniary interest. The Court
affirmed the trial court's denial of Grandfather's motion to intervene, not
on grounds that Grandather lacked standing as an "interested person," but
because B.V.G.'s interests were adequately represented by counsel without
Grandfather's intervention. By examining this case, advocacy strategies to
increase likelihood of allowance of a motion to intervene are exposed.
Promoting the best interests and liberty of the ward, emphasizing subjective
uniqueness of circumstances to broaden the class of "interested persons,"
and demonstrating in good faith inadequate representation likely increases
the rate of allowed motions to intervene in guardianship proceedings.
Kathryn E. Martin

advocate. Id. at 955.

